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China Information
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Organization and Procedure in Environmental Law Enforcement: Sichuan in Comparative Perspective

Benjamin Van Rooij

Van Vollenhoven Institute of the Faculty of Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands

This study provides a comparative and internal organizational analysis of the problems of enforcing environmental law in Sichuan. Firstly, from a comparative perspective, the study shows that Sichuan does not perform as well as the richer provinces in Eastern China, mainly due to a lack of local government funding and local environmental awareness. Secondly, when we compare the provincial level with the subprovincial level, we find that the Sichuan provincial EPB is weaker and more understaffed than the subprovincial EPBs. The provincial level's enforcement activities are mainly indirect, consisting largely of verifying the enforcement work of subordinate lower level EPBs. From an internal organizational perspective, this study finds, firstly, that because of the centralist way in which Sichuan's EPBs are organized internally, the bureau, as a whole, has become more dependent on its local government, in whose interests, the environment is often less important than the local economy. Secondly, it finds that the centralist bureau organization, in combination with the bureau's enforcement procedure, provides a large degree of discretionary power to those involved in enforcement pro cedure. This has an adverse impact on the bureau's enforcement activities.

Key Words: local governance • law • environmental protection

China Information, Vol. 17, No. 2, 36-64 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/0920203X0301700202


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